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Spinoza is a panpsychist. For him, mentality is a pervasive and fundamental feature of the natural 
world. But he also believes the much stronger claim that every single physical thing—plants, 
rocks, stars, donkeys, the organs of a human body, etc.—has a mind. This is because he identifies 
each of God’s ideas with a mind. Because God is omniscient and has an idea of each physical 
thing whatsoever, each physical thing has a mind. Why does he believe this and what does it 
mean?  
 
Before we try to answer this question, it will be useful to review some basic features of Spinoza’s 
metaphysics. To begin with, Spinoza thinks that there is only one fundamental being or 
substance, which he identifies with God or Nature. That is, Spinoza naturalizes God or, 
alternatively, deifies nature. (Henceforth I will use ‘Nature’ with a capital ‘N’ to indicate this 
substance.) Nature is something that is “in itself.” By this, Spinoza means that there is nothing 
more fundamental than Nature in terms of which the existence of Nature can be understood. 
Nothing explains the existence of Nature, either causally or metaphysically, but the nature of 
Nature itself. For this reason, Spinoza says that Nature is self-caused. Nature is also conceived 
through itself. That is, thinking about Nature does not require thinking about any other thing. 
Nature is conceptually self-contained. Spinoza thinks that these features entail that there can be 
only one Nature and it is infinite, eternal and necessary.  
 
Nature, the one infinite substance, can be thought of in infinitely many ways. These ways of 
thinking about Nature are called “attributes” and they express its essence. These attributes are 
different ways of thinking about or conceiving of the essence of Nature. For reasons that are 
obscure, Spinoza thinks that we know only two of these attributes, thought and extension. 
‘Extension’ is Spinoza’s word for the physical. Leaving aside the unknown attributes, we can 
think about Nature as both mental (thinking) and physical (extended). Nature can be conceived 
under either attribute.  The important point for our purposes is that Nature thinks. It has ideas, 
which constitute its thoughts. Nature is also physical. Bodies of all sorts (particles, human bodies, 
stars, etc.) are modes of Nature conceived physically. What does nature think about? It thinks 
about itself conceived of physically. That is, its ideas represent its modes of extension including 
bodies.  
 
It is important to emphasize that Nature conceived of as thinking is the very same thing as 
Nature conceived of as extended. Thought and extension are not two essential properties of this 
nature. Rather, they are different ways of thinking about the very same essence of the substance. 
Thus, Spinoza is a conceptual dualist but not a metaphysical one. How can Nature be thought of 
in two different ways without those ways implying a metaphysical difference? The answer is that 
these different ways of conceiving do not say different things about Nature. Their contents are 
identical. They merely express those contents in a different format or present them differently. 
Because both thought and extension are equally fundamental, Spinoza is neither a materialist nor 
an idealist. Nature can be completely and accurately represented as either mental or physical.   
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Spinoza thinks that there is only one fundamental thing but that there are many derivative things. 
His terms for these non-fundamental beings are modes. Cabbages, kings, shoes and ships are all 
modes of nature. So too are the human body and mind.  
 
The correct metaphysical analysis of these modes is a controversial matter. Many readers of 
Spinoza think that they are properties of Nature. In this paper, I will proceed on the basis of an 
interpretation according to which modes are Nature insofar as it satisfies certain conditions. This 
should be understood on the model of a wave, which is a medium insofar as it oscillates, or a fist, 
which is a hand insofar as it is clenched. Bodies are thus like waves on the oceans of extension 
and minds are like waves on the oceans of thought. Modes so conceived are not properties. We 
can see this by considering the following example. The ocean insofar as it oscillates (a subject 
insofar as it satisfies some condition) is noisy. But the expression the ocean insofar as it oscillates 
does not refer to a property. We can see by considering the falsity of the statement the property of 
oscillation is noisy. Not only is this statement false but any statement that attributes the property 
of being noisy to a property is also false. And thus, generalizing from this case, we can conclude 
that any expression of the form x insofar as φ doesn’t refer to a property but rather an object. 
Minds and bodies are modes and so, on this construal of modes they are objects. Such objects as 
waves, fists, and dents are obviously derivative objects. We can say that they are constituted by 
the subjects that, in virtue of satisfying some condition, determine them to exist.  Although I will 
proceed on the basis of this interpretation, none of my conclusions depend upon it. Those who 
prefer alternative interpretations are free to substitute them in what follows.  
 
Mind in the Seventeenth Century 
 
Spinoza’s philosophy of mind is in many respects a response to a revolution introduced by 
Descartes. According to Descartes, the mind and body are two distinct substances that have 
nothing in common. Among the characteristic features of the mind are consciousness, simplicity, 
and being the cause of intelligent action. Mind is also the substance in which perceptions and 
volitions inhere.  
 
The nature of body is three-dimension Euclidean extension. Individual bodies are regions of 
three-dimensional extension that are capable of motion and rest. Because we can clearly and 
distinctly conceive of minds existing independently of bodies, Descartes concludes that the mind 
and body are distinct substances.  
 
On this picture, the physical world is cleanly separated from the mental world insofar as they play 
no role in metaphysically constituting one another. Causal connections do, however, run between 
the mental and the physical. Inputs from the physical world causally explain sense perceptions in 
the mind. Outputs from the mental world causally explain the bodily motions that constitute 
intelligent action. Thus Descartes endorses mind-body substance dualism with causal interaction.  
 
Many seventeenth century philosophers who are otherwise sympathetic to Descartes’ 
innovations in the philosophy of mind reject mind-body interaction. How can two substances 
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with nothing in common causally interact? For many post-Cartesian philosophers, the answer is 
that they can’t. Fire heats because it is hot. Donkeys beget donkeys because they are donkeys. 
Similarity is required for causation.1 
 
Spinoza is among those philosophers who are sympathetic to the Cartesian notion that mind and 
body are dissimilar but is hostile to interaction. Spinoza is hostile to the idea of interaction 
because there are no connections between the concepts of two things that have nothing in 
common. There must be, however, connections between the concept of an effect and the concept 
of its cause. Therefore, two things with nothing in common cannot causally interact.  
 
It is not an easy thing to deny mind-body interaction because there are many correlations between 
the mental and the physical that strongly suggest interaction. When I want a beer and believe that 
there is beer in the fridge, I get up and walk over to the fridge. When you kick my shin, I 
experience pain. What explains the tight correlations that exist between mind and body such as 
these? Spinoza’s answer to this question, his parallelism doctrine, is also the basis of his 
panpsychism.  
 
 
The Parallelism Doctrine 
 
In proposition 7 of part 2 of the Ethics, Spinoza says: 
 The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of 
things.  
This means that the mental realm and the physical realm are causally isomorphic. For every body 
there is an idea that represents it and for every idea there is a body represented by it. Moreover, 
there is a one to one mapping from causal relations between bodies to relations between ideas and 
vice versa.  
 
The reason Spinoza believes the parallelism doctrine is most clearly expressed in the following 
passage: 
Before we proceed further, we must recall here what we showed viz. that 
whatever can be perceived by an inﬁnite intellect as constituting an essence of 
substance pertains to one substance only, and consequently that the thinking 
substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is 
now comprehended under this attribute, now under that. So also a mode of 
extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed 
in two ways. Some of the Hebrews seem to have seen this, as if through a cloud, 
when they maintained that God, God’s intellect, and the things understood by 
him are one and the same. […]Therefore, whether we conceive nature under 
the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought, or under any 
                                                          
1 Mcginn.  
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other attribute, we shall ﬁnd one and the same order, or one and the same 
connection of causes, i.e., that the same things follow one another. 
That is, the parallelism follows from the fact that modes of thought and modes of extension are 
identical but conceived of differently. If they are identical, then they cannot differ with respect to 
their causal structure. This raises difficult questions about Spinoza’s denial of mind-body 
interaction but they fall outside of the scope of this essay.   
 
Spinoza’s Panpsychism 
 
Recall that for every body, there is an idea that represents it. Human minds are ideas of human 
bodies. These ideas are in Nature conceived of as a thinking thing. The human mind is thus 
Nature’s idea of our body. Spinoza thinks that there is nothing special about the human mind. 
Just as the human mind is Nature’s idea of the human body, the idea of any body whatsoever is 
the mind of that body. Spinoza writes: 
For the things we have shown so far are completely general and do not pertain 
more to man than to other Individuals, all of which, though in different 
degrees, are nevertheless animate. For of each thing there is necessarily an idea 
in [Nature], of which [Nature] is the cause in the same way as [it] is of the idea 
of the human Body. And so, whatever we have said of the idea of the human 
Body must also be said of the idea of any thing. (2p13s) 
This means that not only do human beings have minds, but also every part of the human body has 
a mind and every non-human body has a mind. In the case of non-human organisms that are 
reasonably complex, this result is more or less intuitive. Many people think that chimpanzees, 
dolphins, and even cats have minds. Perhaps more controversially, many people think that even 
less complex vertebrates have minds of some sort. But Spinoza extends the realm of the minded 
further to include invertebrates, plants, and even what we would classify as inanimate objects 
such as stars, planets, and tiny particles of matter. As the above text attests, Spinoza himself does 
not think that there are any truly inanimate objects. Everything has a mind, that is, is associated 
with an idea that represents it, and is to some degree alive.  
 
Degrees of Mentality 
 
Spinoza’s thesis that each body has a mind, no matter how simple it is, raises several difficult 
questions. The first pertains to the relationship between the mind and intelligent behavior. In his 
Discourse on Method, Descartes claims that our evidence for mentality comes from intelligent 
behavior. According to Descartes, if some system can respond appropriately to an unlimited set 
of circumstances, then the causes of the behavior of that system are mental. For example, in 
competently using language, human beings can understand infinitely many novel sentences and 
in turn, can respond with infinitely many novel sentences. Thus we have evidence that human 
beings other than ourselves have minds. But if a system fails to exhibit such intelligent behavior, 
we have no evidence of mentality and attributing a mind to it would be unjustified. This is a 
plausible idea. Spinoza, on the other hand, attributes minds to systems that do not exhibit any 
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intelligent behavior such as stones, tiny particles of matter, and stars. What could justify him in 
doing so?  
 
Another difficulty stems from Spinoza’s commitment to attributing minds to bodies that lack the 
degree of internal structure that we associate with mentality. For example, we observe a tight 
correlation between mental activity and the human central nervous system, which is very 
complex. We don’t observe a tight correlation between mental activity and any more simple 
system. This strongly suggests that only physical systems with a high degree of internal 
complexity can have minds. Spinoza, however, is committed to attributing minds to any bodies 
whatsoever, no matter how simple they may be. How could he argue for the plausibility of such 
attributions despite the observed correlation between complexity and mentality?  
 
Two final difficulties comes from Spinoza’s claim that not only the human body, but also every 
part of the human body has a mind that is a part of my mind. Every atom, every cell, every organ 
composing my body has a mind. What is more, each of these minds is a part of my mind. The first 
difficulty is that I seem to be unaware of a great deal that happens in my body. For example, my 
pancreas is currently producing insulin. If my pancreas has a mind and that mind is part of my 
mind, why am I unaware of this? The second difficulty concerns how these various minds can 
compose a greater mind, viz., my own mind. This is a difficult question because, it is plausible to 
think, under no circumstances do human minds ever compose greater minds of which they are 
parts. This strongly suggests that minds in general do not compose.  
 
Spinoza is aware of these problems. His response to the problems relating to intelligent action 
and complexity is to claim that all bodies are “to some degree” “animata.” (1p13s) The word 
animata is generally translated as animate and although Spinoza does believe that all bodies are 
animate to some degree, I think the word is also meant to resonate with animus, which Spinoza 
uses as a synonym for mind (mens).2 Thus, Spinoza is saying that all bodies to some degree are alive 
and have a mind. 
 
The notion that the mental comes in degrees is crucial to Spinoza’s claim that mind is pervasive 
throughout nature. It is more plausible to claim that stones and plants have minds if they have 
minds only to a very low degree than if minds are attributed to them without qualification. But 
what does it mean for mind to come in degrees?  
 
Part of Spinoza’s account of what it means for bodies to be animate to different degrees is given 
in the following text: 
 
I say this in general, that in proportion as a Body is more capable than others of 
doing many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at once, so its Mind 
is more capable than others of perceiving many things at once, And in 
proportion as the actions of a body depend more on itself alone, and as other 
                                                          
2 See for example, 2a3.  
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bodies concur with it less in acting, so its mind is more capable of 
understanding distinctly. And from these [truths] we can know the excellence 
of one mind over the others.3  
Spinoza thinks that some minds are more capable of perceiving many things at once than others 
are and also that some minds understand things more distinctly than other minds do. He claims 
that the ability of the mind to perceive many things at once is proportional to its body’s ability to 
do many things at once and the ability of the mind to understand things distinctly is proportional 
to the extent to which the actions of the body depend upon the body alone.  
 
Why does Spinoza think that the mind’s ability to perceive many things at once is proportional to 
the body’s ability to do many things at once? The answer is found in Spinoza’s account of sense 
perception and complex individuality. According to him, the primary content of the idea of the 
body, i.e., the mind, is the body itself. But when the body interacts with the external world, the 
state of the body depends not just on the nature of the body but also on the nature of the external 
causes that affect it. In this way, by representing the body, it represents a state of the body that 
carries information about the external world. The body’s ability to acquire states that encode 
information about the external world depends upon its ability to do many things. To see why, we 
need to look at Spinoza’s account of complex physical things like human bodies. 
 
A complex body such as the human body is defined by a pattern of motion that obtains between 
its parts. Such a body survives the changes it undergoes just in case the pattern of motion and rest 
that characterizes it is preserved. So if environmental inputs alter the motions of the parts of a 
complex body, that body survives the resulting changes so long as these new motions are 
incorporated into the body in such a way that its overall pattern of motion and rest is preserved.   
 
There are various ways in which encounters with external causes may be survived. A stone, for 
example, pursues a very simple strategy. It does one thing in response to all external causes: its 
parts remain bonded together and communicate the motions introduced in a more or less uniform 
way. Most significantly, it does not respond differentially to the way in which causal inputs from 
the environment are structured. For this reason, its states don’t carry very much information 
about its external causes. But a human body pursues a much more complex strategy. In the 
response to external stimuli, it responds very differently depending on the structure of the 
stimuli. For example, while the stone is indifferent to anything but the total energy of the wave 
produced by the handclap, the human body responds differently depending on how that energy is 
structured. Wavelength, frequency, and amplitude all matter to the human body but not to the 
stone.  
 
In this way, Spinoza explains the seeming lack of mentality on the part of bodies that do not 
possess complex internal structure. Very simple bodies encode very little information about their 
external causes and thus the minds associated with them perceive very little about the external 
causes of their states.  Very complex bodies encode much more information about their external 
causes and so the minds of those bodies perceive much more about their external environment.  
                                                          
3 2p13s. 
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Let us now turn our attention to the claim that the more actions depend upon the body alone, the 
more the mind understands distinctly. Spinoza thinks that causal responsibility is a degreed 
notion. This is intuitively plausible. Suppose that by myself I cannot lift an object that weighs one 
hundred pounds because I can only generate enough force to lift ninety pounds. I fully exert 
myself and you help by contributing the force needed to go from ninety to one hundred. There is 
a clear intuitive sense in which I am doing more of the work than you. If through resistance 
training I go from an ability to lift ninety pounds to an ability to lift ninety-nine pounds, then the 
next time we lift the weight together, and I fully exert myself, then I have contributed even more 
of the work.4  
 
Spinoza thinks that most human behavior is partially explained by environmental inputs. This is 
clearly the case where sense experience guides action because sense experience requires 
environmental inputs. Spinoza also thinks that our cognitive behavior is purely rational only when 
environmental inputs do not explain it in any way. Spinoza is a rationalist who thinks that sense 
experience is the source of error and confusion, so we are at our cognitive best when our thinking 
is free from the influence of sense experience. We engage in rational thinking fully divorced from 
sense perception when we are doing pure mathematics and when we engage in pure philosophical 
reasoning. But although we are not perfectly rational when environmental inputs help determine 
our thoughts and behavior, we can still be more or less rational, depending upon how much our 
own nature contributes to the explanation of what we do and think. The more it contributes, the 
more rational we are.  
 
Spinoza relates structural complexity to power: the power of acting of a body and the correlative 
power of thinking of a mind are a function of complexity. Human beings are more capable of 
rational thought than, for example, fish or worms because their bodies and minds are so much 
more complex. Stones too have minds, but their bodies are even less complex than worms, and so 
they are, for all intents and purposes, incapable of rational thought. These conclusions help 
minimize the implausibility of attributing minds to creatures that lack the structural complexity 
that is correlated with mindedness.  
 
This also helps to solve the problem of how Spinoza can attribute minds to bodies that don’t 
exhibit intelligent behavior. Because Spinoza associates power with complexity, very simple 
bodies do not have much power of acting just as their minds do not have much power of thinking. 
The minds of such creatures are nothing more than mute representations that generate few 
effects. However, when such representations join together to form complex wholes, new powers 
of thought are generated. And as a consequence of the parallelism doctrine, new powers of action 
in the body are also generated. Intelligent behavior is characteristic only of such complex bodies.  
 
It is sometimes alleged that Spinoza needs a distinction between (1) minds that are subjects of 
conscious experience and those that are not, and (2) ideas that are conscious and those that are 
not. The first distinction is needed because it is implausible to ascribe consciousness to, for 
example, stones because they lack the structural complexity that we associate with 
                                                          
4 I have adapted this example from Della Rocca, 2008, p. 115.  
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consciousness. The second distinction is needed because Spinoza is committed to the claim that 
the human mind contains an idea of every part of its body. But I am unaware of the action of my 
pancreas and many other events occurring in my body. Thus, if I have ideas that represent these 
things, they must be unconscious. It is further alleged, that Spinoza has no way of consistently 
making out any such distinctions.   
 
It is true that Spinoza cannot distinguish between conscious and unconscious minds, and 
conscious and unconscious ideas, but he has a related distinction that may serve just as well: he 
distinguishes degrees of consciousness. 
  
Spinoza links power and complexity to consciousness. Consider the following passage:  
 
[H]e who, like an infant or child, has a Body capable of very few things, and 
very heavily dependent on external causes, has a Mind which considered solely 
in itself is conscious of almost nothing of itself, or of God, or of things. On the 
other hand, he who has a Body capable of a great many things, has a Mind 
which considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself, and of God, and 
of things.5  
 
We have already encounter the claim that a mind is more capable of perceiving more things at 
once and is more excellent, the more powerful its body is. Here the claim is extended to 
consciousness as well. The more powerful a body is the more conscious its mind is.  
 
Spinoza’s remarks on consciousness are sketchy at best, but perhaps he could be read as 
describing a kind of functional account of consciousness. A powerful bodily state entails, by 
virtue of the parallelism, a powerful idea. An idea that is powerful contributes more to the 
determination of the mind’s future states. That is, the idea contributes more to reasoning. This 
could be likened to a kind of access consciousness: an idea is conscious to the degree that it 
contributes to determining the direction of thought and contributes content to it. It seems, 
however, less compelling as an account of phenomenal consciousness.  
 
Because Spinoza links structural complexity with power and power to consciousness, stones are, 
due to their structural simplicity, conscious to only a very minimal degree. Likewise, thoughts 
about my pancreas do not determine my other thoughts to any appreciable degree. This suggests 
that they have only a very small amount of power. Consequently, they will be the subjects of only 
the dimmest conscious awareness. Thus, while Spinoza does not have the resources to draw a 
line between conscious and unconscious states and entities, he can place entities and states on a 
spectrum of consciousness.  
 
The last problem we have to consider is how minds can compose minds. Recall that the human 
mind is just Nature’s idea of the human body. Spinoza tells us that the human mind is not special 
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in this regard and that we can regard Nature’s idea of any body as the mind of that body. But the 
human body is composed of simpler bodies, each of which is represented by an idea in Nature’s 
mind. Thus we must conclude that each idea of each part of the human body is a mind. The 
human mind is a complex mind each part of which is itself a mind.  
 
This might be regarded as implausible. To see why it seems implausible, consider the putative 
fact that human minds never join together to form more complex superhuman minds. Indeed it’s 
very difficult to see how that could ever happen in principle. This could be taken as evidence for 
the principle that minds don’t compose minds.  
 
But if we look at the details of how Spinoza thinks that simpler minds compose more complex 
minds, the account is not as implausible as it might first appear. To begin with, it must be 
emphasized that the human mind is not a substance, as it is for Descartes. Instead, Spinoza holds 
that it is a collection of ideas. In this way, it is not entirely dissimilar to the bundle theory of the 
mind familiar from Hume. The difference between the bundle theory and Spinoza’s theory is that 
Spinoza adds the further claim that the ideas in the bundle compose a single complex idea. Thus, 
although it is strictly speaking correct to say that every part of the body has a mind, it’s a bit 
misleading because Spinoza is deflating the mind not inflating ideas. The notion of a complex 
idea that is composed of simpler ideas is much more familiar (think of psychologically real 
complex concepts composed of simpler concepts), than the idea of complex minds composed of 
simpler minds. Spinoza just assimilates the latter to the former.  
 
Moreover, Spinoza denies the claim that human minds don’t compose with other minds to form 
more complex minds. Indeed, he repeatedly asserts that the human mind is part of the infinite 
intellect which is the mind of the totality of finite corporeal creatures. Thus Spinoza clearly 
believes that his claim that the human mind has parts that are themselves minds is not in conflict 
with any general principles prohibiting minds from composing.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Spinoza believes that each body—every animal, plant, particle, and star—has a mind. Moreover, 
every complex body composed of simpler bodies has a complex mind composed of simpler 
minds. And just as bodies are modes of extended nature, minds are modes of thinking nature. 
Minds are thus Nature’s ideas of the body. This view might seem to conflict with four plausible 
claims: (1) minds are possessed only by creatures capable of intelligent behavior; (2) minds are 
associated with only creatures with complex bodies; (3) we are unconscious of many things that 
happen in our bodies; and (4) minds do not compose. Spinoza responds to (1)-(3) with an account 
of degrees of power of thinking, which he associates with structural complexity. He is thus able to 
claim that although creatures incapable of any appreciable intelligent action and lacking structural 
complexity have minds, they have minds with very little power of thinking. And because he 
arguably has a functionalist account of consciousness, many ideas/minds will have very low levels 
of consciousness. With respect to (4), he assimilates minds to ideas and thus the claim that minds 
compose is no more implausible than the claim that ideas compose. Because many thoughts are 
complex, this is not implausible at all.  
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